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Family ownership was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century in Britain. The main cause was equity
issued in the process of making acquisitions. In the first half of the century, it occurred in the
absence of minority investor protection and relied on directors of target firms protecting the interests
of shareholders. Families were able to retain control by occupying a disproportionate number of
seats on the boards of firms. However, in the absence of large stakes, the rise of hostile takeovers
and institutional shareholders made it increasingly difficult for families to maintain control without
challenge. Potential targets attempted to protect themselves through dual class shares and strategic
share blocks but these were dismantled in response to opposition by institutional shareholders and
the London Stock Exchange. The result was a regulated market in corporate control and a capital
market that looked very different from its European counterparts. Thus, while acquisitions facilitated
the growth of family controlled firms in the first half of the century, they also diluted their












I strut around my stately life 
Hand in hand with lover and wife. 
I even own a share or two 
In a family firm my father grew. 
 
Of course I have not the slightest view 
On what this firm is supposed to do. 
Nor have I any reason to care 
Since in absentia I sit in a Chair, 
Of a Board that yesterday I chose to hire 
And tomorrow I’ve decided that I will fire. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The UK is a strange country.  It does not have concentrated ownership; most countries 
do.  It does not have pyramid structures; most countries do.  Family ownership is of 
limited significance; in most countries it is extensive.  There are few dual class shares; 
in many countries they are extensive.  It has an active market in corporate control; 
elsewhere, it is largely non-existent.   
 
By way of a measure of its peculiarity, Becht and Mayer (2001) report that in a 
majority of listed Austrian, German and Italian firms there is a single voting block of 
shares that commands a majority of votes in these companies.  Families account for 
45% of blocks in Austria, 32% in Germany and 30% in Italy.  The average size of the 
blocks is 26% in Austria, 27% in Germany and 20% in Italy.  In the UK, on average 
the largest voting block will usually cast under 10% of votes, while less than 5% of 
blocks are attributable to families and the average size of their blocks is only 5%.  
There is a stark contrast in the significance of families in corporate control between 
the UK and the rest of Europe. 
 
Even by the standards of the US, the UK is odd.  Dual class shares are by no means 
absent from the US.  Powerful families established some of the largest corporations in 
the US and pyramids were at least at one stage widespread.  The US may be odd but 
Britain is even more peculiar. 
 
Why is the UK so different?  Was it always so deviant?  The British business history 
literature would seem to suggest not.  Family ownership has been a dominant theme in   2
British business history.  Alfred Chandler developed a thesis of comparative industrial 
performance around differences between managerial capitalism in North America and 
family organizations in Europe.   He argued that the UK was held back at the turn of 
the century by a continuing reliance on family as against professional managerial 
capitalism.  Successes were restricted to industries in which there were modest 
investment requirements, most notably branded packaged goods.  Companies such as 
Beechams, Cadbury, Colman, Reckitt and Rowntree were dominated by their owners 
and had little professional management.  The consequences were most seriously felt in 
those industries that required large-scale investments – chemicals, electrical 
equipment and metals; these declined markedly in relation to their German and US 
competitors.   David Landes (1965, pp 536-64) described the stereotypical image of 
the British family firm as being an organization founded by fanatical fathers and 
succeeded by squabbling siblings who “worked at play and played at work”.   
 
According to this view, at the beginning of the 20
th century, as in most other 
countries, powerful families dominated the British corporate sector.  They may have 
been incompetent but at least they were there and presumably their extinction was a 
consequence of their incompetence.  As a result, the origins of the British corporate 
system are quite conventional and its current anomalous status is a consequence of the 
normal workings of market forces.  
 
Plausible though this story is, we argue in this paper that it is probably not an accurate 
and certainly not a complete description of what transpired.  At the very least it does 
not capture the rich interaction that occurred between financial markets and 
companies in the UK.   
 
There are many aspects of this that are misleading.  The first is that while families 
were important at the beginning of the twentieth century, their significance did not in 
general derive from long-term large-scale ownership of British companies.  By way of 
ownership, families were rapidly marginalized.  The pattern of ownership, which we 
report above as characterizing corporate Britain today, emerged early in the twentieth 
century. 
   3
Instead, the significance of family influence claimed by Chandler comes from a 
different source.  While families rapidly relinquished ownership, they retained control 
through their positions on the boards of directors.  They often held the all-important 
position of chairman of the board and even if they did not then their board 
representation was frequently disproportionate to their ownership stakes.  This is quite 
different from the pattern observed in Continental European countries of extensive 
family ownership with delegated managerial control.  In Britain families exerted 
power without responsibility whereas in most countries they had responsibility with at 
least limited power. 
 
Still more interesting than the nature of ownership and control was the process by 
which it came about.  Family ownership did not for the most part decline because 
families sold out.  They did not typically abandon firms through company flotations 
or share sales.  Instead, their holdings were diluted in the process of issuing shares to 
finance growth.  In a sample of firms that we will describe below, we estimate that 
issues of shares associated with acquisitions, rights issues and placings accounted for 
almost two-thirds of the decline in directors’ shareholdings over the period 1900 to 
1950.  A majority of this issuance arose from one particular activity of firms, namely 
acquisitions.  More than half of the dilution (36.2%) of the 61.6% is associated with 
issues of shares for acquisitions.  Shares were not primarily issued to finance internal 
investments but rather to acquire other firms. 
 
The changing pattern of ownership of British firms during the century was primarily a 
product of the immense amount of takeover activity that occurred during the 20
th 
century.  Hannah (1976), for example, documents the three major merger waves that 
occurred around 1900, 1920 and 1930.  Many of these mergers were consolidations of 
several companies, establishing the corporate groupings that dominated the rest of the 
century. 
 
What is remarkable about this process of ownership dilution is that it occurred in 
largely unregulated equity markets with little protection to minority investors.  In this 
paper we explore this acquisition process.  We document how it went through various 
stages. In the first half of the twentieth century there was no market for corporate 
control.  All mergers were the result of an agreement between the two or more boards   4
of the merging companies.  Often a holding company was created to buy all the shares 
of the combining firms, with the old boards of directors forming a new board.   
Mergers were the result of co-operation rather than competition between companies 
for a target in an auction market. 
 
During the 1940’s and 1950’s there were important changes in the UK capital 
markets.  First, following a number of scandals, minority investor protection was 
strengthened at the end of the 1940’s.  Disclosure was improved and anti-director 
provisions were introduced.  Second, there was a sharp increase in institutional 
ownership.  By 1960, institutions were the largest shareholder in more than a third of 
the companies in our sample.  Third, and most significantly, a market for corporate 
control emerged:  “for the first time it became popular for the ownership of public 
companies to be determined simply by stock market transactions and for control to 
pass thereby to parties previously unconnected with the firm” (Roberts (1992) p.183).   
   
Charles Clore launched the first hostile takeover in 1953 for a large shoe chain called 
J. Sears Holdings.  This bid introduced the concept of paying a significant premium 
for the shares of target firms.  Whereas before 1950 there was little difference in cost 
between partial and full acquisitions, the emergence of hostile takeovers substantially 
increased the cost of acquiring full ownership.  As a consequence, it became attractive 
to make partial rather than full bids for companies.   
 
Companies responded by attempting to protect themselves and their minority 
shareholders against the takeover threat.  We estimate that within a period of 15 years 
about 7.5% of listed companies had issued dual class shares with discriminatory 
voting rights.  In others, they sought protection under the wing of a friendly parent.  In 
particular, in the brewing industry, Whitbread provided protection through large 
stakes to several local brewers under what became known as ‘the Whitbread 
umbrella’.   
 
Partial acquisitions, dual class shares and strategic block holdings gave rise, at least 
temporarily, to shareholding patterns that are currently commonplace on the Continent 
but were previously rare in the UK.  This is a particularly interesting stage in the 
development of the British corporation because it could at this point have switched   5
into Continental European mode with dual class shares and pyramids.  In Japan, 
similar takeovers threats in the post WW2 period prompted the erection of elaborate 
defences in the form of cross-shareholdings that have persisted until today.  But this 
did not happen in Britain.  Financial institutions had become steadily more influential 
investors in equities by the 1950s and 1960s, and with the agreement of the stock 
exchanges they were able to deny these firms access to the capital markets.  The result 
was the dismantling of the protective measures until they were virtually extinguished 
by the 1980’s.  The elimination of dual class shares and pyramids in the UK was 
therefore due to the dominance of institutional investors.  In other countries, 
corporations were more significant holders of corporate equity
1 and derived benefits 
from the retention of mechanisms such as pyramids and dual class shares for 
sustaining control.    
 
Instead, the more enduring response to the emergence of a market for corporate 
control was regulatory.  The Takeover Panel was established in 1968.  Its first rules 
included mandatory bid and equal price requirements ensuring offers be made at the 
same price to all shareholders once 30% of a target had been purchased.  These two 
rules had the effect of both preventing discriminatory price offers and the build up of 
large share blocks. 
 
By the beginning of the 1970’s the key features of current UK corporate ownership 
and control were in place: substantial institutional shareholdings, a hostile takeover 
market and extensive minority investor protection.  Together they had the effect of 
establishing active markets in corporate control.   
 
In a companion paper, we have documented that dilution of family ownership has 
been a feature of the whole of the twentieth century, in large part due to share 
acquisitions.  But not only was acquisition the main cause of the dilution, it was also 
its main effect.  At the start of the century families could expect to retain control over 
extended periods as directors if not owners of their firms and their approval was 
required before changes in control through takeover could take place.  By the end of 
the century, family board representation was not sufficient to ensure continuity of 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Franks and Mayer (2001) for data on corporate holdings in Germany.   6
control in the face of hostile takeovers.  This had two consequences.  Firstly, the 
feature that Chandler had noted of the dominance of management by families was less 
evident by the end of the century.  Secondly, dilution of ownership had control as well 
as cash flow consequences for families.  Management had therefore become more 
professional and families were unable to preserve the continuity of control that they 
enjoyed in the first half of the century. 
 
As Davies and Hopt (2004) note, despite similarities in the structure of their capital 
markets and the common law nature of their legal systems, the UK and US today 
allocate decision rights regarding takeover offers in very different ways.  In the UK 
they reside with the target shareholders, whereas in those state jurisdictions in the US 
that are sympathetic to the use of poison pills as takeover defences, most notably in 
Delaware, they reside with the target management.  The exposure of target 
management to hostile takeovers in the UK is not therefore simply a product of its 
common law or dispersed ownership system.  Politics, in the guise of the growing 
influence of institutional investors in the second half of the 20
th century, may have 
been at least as important in establishing the UK’s unusually active market in 
corporate control. 
 
In Section 2 we describe the data sets that we employ in this chapter.  In Section 3, we 
record the evolution of family ownership, board representation and the rise of 
institutional share ownership.  Section 4 describes the merger and acquisitions process 
in the first of the century.  Section 5 looks at how a takeover market emerged in the 
second half of the twentieth century.  Section 6 concludes the chapter and examines 
the implications of these developments for family control of British companies. 
   7
2 Data   
 
We employ three data sets in this chapter. The first comprises individual firm data on 
the ownership and board representation of samples of firms incorporated around 1900 
and 1960.  There were 20 firms that were incorporated or (re-) incorporated between 
1897 and 1903 and were still in existence in 2001 and 20 firms that were incorporated 
between 1958 and 1962 and were still in existence in 2001; we have collected data on 
all of these.  To avoid the obvious bias that might arise from the greater longevity of 
the 1900 than the 1960 sample, we collected a third sample of 20 firms incorporated 
around 1900 that are no longer in existence today.  We compare the evolution of 
ownership and control of the 1960 sample with both the surviving and non-surviving 
1900 samples. 
 
The data have been assembled from (i) archives of company accounts and share 
registers (including names and size of shareholdings) stored at Companies House in 
Cardiff, and at the Public Records in Kew, Richmond (Surrey)
2 (ii) new issue 
prospectuses at the Guildhall Library in London, (iii) annual issues of the Stock 
Exchange Year Book which lists names of directors and the sources of any changes in 
issued capital, and (iv) Official Lists of trading of securities from the British Library 
in London.  Share registers provided evidence of annual ownership changes and the 
annual returns to Companies House gave details of resignations of existing directors 
and appointments of new directors.   
 
From these data, we collected names of directors, their shareholdings (including those 
of their families), the date and amounts of capital issued in acquisitions, new share 
issues via public and private placements, and other changes in share capital, such as 
capitalisations of reserves.  We traced the founding family ownership from 
incorporation until the last family member left the board by recording shareholdings 
and place of residence of family members taking account of name changes across 
                                                            
2 Since the beginning of the 20
th century, firms in the UK have been required to file information at a 
central depository called Companies House now situated in Cardiff, Wales.  This is a remarkable and 
largely unique long-run source of data on firms.  However, it suffers from one deficiency: Companies 
House retains complete records on all firms that are still in existence today but discards information on 
most but not all dead companies.   We therefore supplemented data from Companies House with a 
second source of public information from the Public Records in Kew, Richmond (Surrey), which keeps 
some information on dead companies.   8
generations, when for example the daughter of a founder married.  We also traced 
shareholdings through intermediary firms.  For outside shareholdings, we limited 
ourselves to stakes greater than 1% of ordinary capital.  We used newspaper archives 
to document evidence of tender offers and trading in provincial Stock Exchanges, 
especially in the early 1900s. 
 
The second data set collected for this study includes information on anti-takeover 
defences (dual class shares, voting right restrictions and insider block holdings) for 
about 1800 listed firms in two LSE industry classifications, Breweries and Industrials 
and Commercials.  
 
The third data set comes from Hannah’s (1974a) list of takeovers over the period 1919 
to 1939 and includes announcement dates of takeovers from the Financial Times 
newspaper, the medium of exchange, dividend changes and board turnover from the 
Stock Exchange Year Book, and share prices from the Daily Official List (at the 
Guildhall Library).  Newspaper archives are used to document evidence on the 
hostility of takeover activity, particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
3  Ownership and Board Representation 
 
3.1  Ownership 
 
According to Rajan and Zingales (2003), the UK has had one of the largest stock 
markets in the world throughout the twentieth century.  Table 1 reports the number of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the market value of listed 
securities for the period 1853 to 1939.  As the Stock Exchange did not collect 
aggregate statistics over this period, several other sources have had to be used.   
According to Killick and Thomas (1970) and Michie (1999), around 1850, provincial 
stock exchanges had more listed companies than the LSE - 490 as against 200.   Hart 
and Prais (1956) record a large expansion of listed companies on the LSE over the 
period 1885 to 1939 though their data only refer to industrial and commercial 
companies.  From 1963, the LSE has kept a continuous series of aggregate equity 
market values, including preference and dual class shares.  One of the most striking   9
features is the marked decline in the number of listed firms that has occurred over the 
past 40 years (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 2 records family shareholdings of a sample of 20 companies incorporated 
around 1900 and 20 incorporated around 1960 that were still in existence in 2001 (the 
“survivors”) and a sample of 20 companies incorporated around 1900 that died during 
the century (“non-survivors”).  It documents the number of companies where the 
founding family’s shareholding passes a particular threshold of 25%, 50% and 75% of 
equity.  Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) report that insider ownership declined 
rapidly and at similar rates in the first and second half of the centuries.  Rates of 
ownership dispersion were similar in samples of companies incorporated in 1900 and 
1960.  Table 2 confirms that family ownership was rapidly diluted throughout the 
century.  By 1940, forty years after incorporation, the number of firms in which 
families owned more than 25% of shares had declined from 13 to 4 amongst the 
survivors.  Family ownership was initially even less pronounced amongst the non-
survivors (9 out of 20 companies passed the 25% threshold) but pro-rata to the 
number of survivors it then declined less rapidly to 4 out of 12 survivors in 1940. 
 
Table 2 shows that this dilution of family ownership was even more noticeable in the 
1960 than in the 1900 sample.  For example, forty years after incorporation, there was 
no company in the 1960 sample in which family ownership passed the 25% threshold.  
Family ownership therefore diminished rapidly throughout the century but much more 
so in the second half of the century.  
 
Table 3 documents how financial institutions emerged to take the place of families as 
dominant owners of corporate Britain around the middle of the twentieth century.  It 
reports the number of cases where a financial institution was the largest shareholder of 
our sample of firms.  Forty years after incorporation, there were 4 cases in the 1900 
survivor sample where a financial institution was the largest shareholder compared 
with 13 in 1990 for the 1960 sample.  The average size of institutional stakes was also 
larger in the second half of the century.  The average stake of the 4 financial 
institutions that were the largest shareholders in the 1900 sample was 5.9% in 1940, 
compared with an average stake of 16.2% in the 13 companies in the 1960 sample in   10
2000.  Thus, in the first half of the century institutional shareholdings were largely 
absent, and where they were present they were quite small.  In contrast, in the second 
half of the century, there were a larger number of stakes held by institutions and they 
were much more significant in size.   
 
In summary, family ownership declined rapidly in the first half of the 20
th century and 
institutions emerged to take the place of families from the middle of the century 
 
3.2 Board  representation 
 
Table 4 shows that family representation on boards persisted for much longer than 
their ownership.  It documents the profile of board representation for the two samples 
of firms at ten yearly intervals.  Over forty years from 1900 to 1940, the percentage of 
board seats held by outside (non-family) shareholders in the sample of survivor firms 
(panel A1) increased from 46% in 1900 to 64% in 1940.  The proportion of firms in 
which families occupied the position of CEO of the board declined from 80% (i.e. 16 
out of 20) to 50% (i.e. 10 out of 20).   As Table 2 recorded, the proportion of survivor 
firms in which families held more than 25% of shares declined much more rapidly by 
45% from 65% (i.e. 13 out of 20) in 1900 to 20% (i.e. 4 out of 20) in 1940.  Family 
representation on the boards did not therefore decline as rapidly as their ownership.   
 
Table 5 provides a summary measure of this.  It reports separation of family 
ownership and control as measured by the difference between family representation 
on the boards of firms and family ownership of shares.  A positive number means that 
family board representation is disproportionate to their ownership.  Table 5 shows that 
at the beginning of the century, family ownership was in excess of their board 
representation but by 1940 it had become disproportionately high. 
 
Panel A2 of Table 4 reports lower family board representation amongst the 1900 non-
survivors than the survivors.  Family board representation was only 32% in 1900 in 
comparison with 55% amongst the survivors and it declined to 7% in 1940.  There 
was therefore less family ownership and less family board representation amongst the 
non-survivors than the survivors in 1900 and families failed to retain board positions 
amongst non-survivors to the degree that they did in survivors.  Table 5 confirms that   11
family board representation did not increase to the same extent relative to ownership 
amongst non-survivors as amongst survivors.  So families retained neither ownership 
nor board positions amongst non-survivors.  Whether the decline of families on the 
boards as well as in the ownership of non-survivors was a cause or a consequence of 
their demise is not a question to which we attempt to provide an answer here.  All we 
do is to note that the difference in family ownership and board representation amongst 
surviving and non-surviving firms may be an interesting approach to evaluating the 
contribution of families to corporate performance. 
 
In the second half of the century, family representation on boards declined more 
rapidly.  Forty years after incorporation, a family member was chairman/CEO in three 
companies in the 1960 sample in comparison with 10 in the 1900 survivors.   
Likewise, the proportion of seats on the boards occupied by families declined to 16% 
forty years after incorporation in the 1960 sample in comparison with 36% in the 
1900 sample.    Thus, family representation on boards as well as ownership declined 
more rapidly in the second than in the first half of the century.   
 
Table 4 shows that relative to their ownership stakes, family representation on boards 
moved in a very similar way in the 1960 to the 1900 survivors, starting from slightly 
more ownership than board representation in 1960 and ending with markedly more 
board representation than ownership 40 years after incorporation in 2000.  Thus, 
families did not match the very rapid decline in their ownership in the second half of 
the century with their share of seats on boards of firms. 
 
In summary, dilution of family ownership occurred rapidly throughout the twentieth 
century.  As the next section describes, this was primarily due to growth through 
acquisition.  However, in the first half of the century families were able to retain 
control in surviving firms through representation on the boards of firms.  In the 
second half, board control as well ownership was rapidly extinguished.  A new form 
of ownership, institutions, emerged in the middle of the century to replace families, 
and, as we document in Section 5, a new form of corporate control, the hostile 
takeover, appeared to replace that exerted by families.   
 
4  Mergers and acquisitions in the first half of the century   12
 
Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2004) argue that the main cause of dispersion of ownership 
during the twentieth century was equity issuance.  In particular, their sample of firms 
grew rapidly through acquisition and in the process issued equity to outside 
shareholders thereby diluting insiders’ shareholdings.  Franks, Mayer and Rossi report 
that insider holdings were diluted over the period 1900 to 1950 at an average rate of 
12.6% per annum.  Of this, none was attributable to IPOs, 4.6% to rights issues, 
20.8% to placings and 36.2% to mergers and acquisitions.
3 
 
During the first half of the century mergers and acquisitions were usually made by the 
bidder approaching the directors and agreeing to purchase their shares.  “An approach 
through the directors, followed by controlled stock transfers on the recommendations 
of the directors (rather than contested takeover raids) remained the norm in these 
years”. (Hannah (1974b), p. 68).  A price was negotiated and management wrote to 
the shareholders stating that “the offer has been unanimously accepted by the 
Directors of your company for the whole of their individual shares, and they have no 
hesitation in recommending its acceptance to the shareholders.”
4  The same terms 
were offered to outside shareholders as the directors. 
 
As Hannah (1974b) has noted, “the loyalty of shareholders to directors was strong, 
and the directors of other companies had a natural aversion to challenging it.  Even if 
a direct bid were to be made, the directors of the victim firm remained in a strong 
position relative to their own shareholders.  In practice the shareholders would 
recognize the superiority of the directors’ information and tend to take their advice on 
the true value of the company in relation to the bid price.” (p. 70-71)  “Directors felt a 
responsibility to recommend offers to their shareholders when the bid price was 
pitched reasonably.” (p. 68-69). It is therefore unsurprising that there was a complete 
absence of hostile takeover bids in the first half of the century. 
 
                                                            
3 In the first half of the century shares were often traded without a prospectus. Shares would simply be 
issued and sold directly by the company to subscribers or be sold through advertisements in the press. 
The IPO event was much more formal after 1948 when prospectuses were compulsory and their 
content strictly regulated prior to trading on recognized stock exchanges such as the LSE.  
4 Quote from Financial Times, Monday 19 January 1920.    13
The continuing presence of families on boards, in particular in the position of 
chairman, even in the absence of ownership, may have been important in upholding 
reputations.  So too were titled directors.  Florence (1953) reports that there were 654 
English peers as active members of city firms in 1932.  Titled directors were 
particularly common in the largest companies.  “At a rough estimate almost half the 
titled directors inherited their title or acquired it by prowess in the fighting services or 
sport and not in business” (Florence (1953), p 245).  “One well-known insurance 
company in 1937 had among sixteen directors, three knights, one baron, one marquis, 
one earl and two dukes” (p 245).  Likewise, May (1939) reports that of 654 British 
peers, 189 of them were directors of companies and held 562 directorates between 
them.  “Sometimes a man with a “good name”, knowing nothing about the business 
and even without residence in the country, is set up as chairman with the principal 
duty of reading the annual speech, which has been written out for him, to the 
shareholders” (May (1939), p. 145).  As Lord Justice Scrutton said in the Court of 
Appeal in the judgement on Combined Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd 1932 “the company 
promoter wants a man whose name will appeal to the public and who does not know 
too much about the business.  The name will attract capital – the company promoter 
will do the rest” (pp. 35-36 of the transcript).  
 
In Tables 6 and 7 we examine the workings of the acquisitions market in the first half 
of the century.  We undertook a series of tests on bid premia, changes in boards, 
dividend responses of targets similar to those that are now routinely performed on 
recent acquisitions in the UK and US.  We report data on 41 M&As in the UK over 
the period 1919 to 1939.  This is the entire population of M&As that met three 
criteria: the market value of target assets exceeded £I million pounds, the targets were 
listed on the LSE and they were classified by the LSE as being in one of three 
industries - breweries and distilleries, industrial and commercial, or iron, coal and 
steel.  
 
Table 6 shows the proportion of target directors who were retained on the board after 
the merger, the number of cases in which the chairman was removed and the change 
in dividends around the announcement of the mergers.  On average, two-thirds of the 
target directors remained on the target’s board after the acquisition.  In 14 of 41 cases 
(approximately one-third of the total), the chairman was removed.  In comparison, in   14
a study of 35 successful hostile takeovers in 1985 and 1986, Franks and Mayer (1996) 
report that 90% of directors were replaced within two years of the bid being 
consummated.  The equivalent figure for 35 accepted bids was 50%.  Board turnover 
was appreciably lower in the first half of the century in comparison with both 
accepted and hostile bids in the second.
5 
 
Table 6 also shows very little change in dividends in the year of the bid compared to 
the previous year in the 1919 to 1939 sample.  In comparison, Franks and Mayer 
(1996) report that dividends were increased in a substantial proportion of both hostile 
and accepted takeovers in 1985 and 1986.  They were increased in 76% of targets of 
successful hostile takeovers in the year before the bid and in 73% of targets two years 
before the bid.   
 
But it is in relation to bid premia that the differences are most pronounced.  Panel A 
of table 7 records that in the sample of 40 targets target shareholders received bid 
premia of –0.9% during the month of the bid (i.e. ‘month 0’), calculated on an equal 
weighted basis. These bid premia are raw equity returns with no adjustment for 
market movements or risk.  Bid premia for months –4 to +1 on the same basis were 
4.9%.  Bid premia were therefore little different from zero.  In contrast, Franks and 
Mayer (1996) report bid premia of between 20 and 30% for hostile and agreed bids 
during 1985 and 1986 in the UK. 
 
The picture that emerges is one of cooperative consolidations between merging firms 
in the first half of the century.  The support of management was required for approval 
by shareholders.  Bid premia were low, the medium of exchange usually involved 
share exchanges, management was frequently kept on the target board and dividend 
changes were modest.  Since acquisitions frequently involved share exchanges, 
acquiring firms avoided the devaluation of their currency that dual class shares would 
have entailed.  The absence of dual class shares in the first half of the century may 
therefore have been intimately linked to the importance of takeovers and their form of 
financing.  
 
                                                            
5 This might indicate greater private benefits accruing to target directors in the early part of the century.   15
This picture of cooperation and little competition was dramatically altered in the 
1950s, as we will describe in Section 6. 
 
5  Three Case Studies 
 
This section describes three cases that illustrate the way in which three prominent 
British firms expanded during the 18
th, 19
th and 20
th centuries, the contribution of 
acquisitions to their growth, the changing nature of family ownership and board 




Dowlais Iron Company was set up in 1759 in the village of Dowlais near Merthyr 
Tydfil in South Wales.  John Guest was appointed as manager of Dowlais in 1767, 
and his grandson became the company’s sole owner in 1851.  The Dowlais Iron 
Company was at this stage the largest iron works in the world, operating 18 blast 
furnaces and employing more than 7,300 people.  The business was the first licensee 
of the Bessemer process, constructing the world’s most powerful rolling mill in 1857, 
and producing its first Bessemer steel in 1865.  
 
The Keen family established the Patent Nut and Bolt Company in 1856 in Smethwick, 
England.  In July 1900, Guest, Keen and Company Limited was incorporated in 
Birmingham with the purpose of taking over the Dowlais Iron Company and the 
Patent Nut and Bolt Co., Ltd.  The shareholders of the two companies received 
250,000 ordinary shares.  At the same time, 400,000 ordinary shares were issued via 
public subscription and the company was floated with 546 ordinary shareholders and 
more than 2000 preference shareholders.  Both classes of shares were traded on the 
London and Birmingham Stock Exchanges.  There was no evidence of the company 
being dispersed before 1900: the company history suggests that both Dowlais Iron Co. 
and the Patent Nut and Bolt were 100% owned by directors and their families.   
Evidence for this comes from a comparison of directors’ holdings with the 
shareholdings of the two companies before the merger.   Since directors’ holdings 
after the flotation were 33.6% of the ordinary shares, and the newly issued shares   16
were 400,000, compared with a pre-issue total of 250,000 we can compute a lower 
bound of directors’ ownership pre-issue of 87.3%.  
 
In 1902 the company acquired Nettlefold and Company, one of the world’s leading 
manufacturers of screws and fasteners set up in Smethwick in 1854, by issuing 
315,000 new ordinary shares. The new company name was then called Guest, Keen, 
and Nettlefolds Limited, and Mr Edward Nettlefold joined the board.  By 1910, the 
directors held 26.4% of issued ordinary shares.  In 1920, shares in Guest, Keen and 
Nettlefolds Ltd. (GKN) were quoted at Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield, while the prices of the transactions 
were marked (i.e. reported) on the official list of the London Stock Exchange.   
 
A crucial decade in the evolution of ownership and control of GKN was then about to 
begin.  First, the company acquired John Lysaght Limited of Bristol (also quoted in 
Bristol and London) in one of the largest tender offers of the decade.
6  GKN then 
undertook two other major tender offers in November 1923, acquiring D Davis and 
Sons and Consolidated Cambrian of Cardiff.   
 
As a consequence of these acquisitions there was a huge increase in the number of 
shareholders: GKN had about 1,000 shareholders before 1920, and more than 20,000 
in 1924.   At this stage, GKN was one of the largest manufacturing businesses in the 
world, involved in every stage of manufacturing from coal and ore extraction to iron 
and steel making and finally to finished products including the nuts, bolts, screws, and 
fasteners for which it was renowned during this period.   
 
GKN formally listed on the London Stock Exchange on June 14, 1946.  By then the 
directors owned a negligible stake and the largest shareholder of the period was the 
Royal Bank of Scotland with 2.37% of issued ordinary shares.   In the second half of 
the century, Prudential Assurance, Norwich Union Life Insurance, Schroder 
Investment Management, and Scottish Widows Investment Management among 
                                                            
6 Details of the deal are as follows: in January 1920, GKN issued 1,989,919 new ordinary shares and 
2,652,331 preference shares. Ordinary shareholders of John Lysaght Ltd were offered 4 new 2
nd 
preference and 3 new ordinary shares in GKN for every 3 ordinary shares held.   17
others alternated as the largest shareholders with stakes varying from 3% to 5.25% of 
issued equity capital. 
 
The picture that emerges from GKN is of a firm whose shares were initially traded on 
local provincial exchanges, that expanded rapidly through acquisitions, broadened its 
shareholder base both numerically and geographically in the process, and that by the 
beginning of the second half of the twentieth century was widely held primarily by 
institutional shareholders.  
 
5.2  Case Study of Schweppes 
 
In 1783, 43-year-old German born Jean Jacob Schweppe invented an efficient system 
for the manufacture of mineral water.  In 1790, he entered a partnership to expand the 
business and established a factory in London, UK.  Around 1800 he changed his and 
the business name to Schweppes, while continuing to expand on a national scale. By 
1831, J. Schweppes & Co. becomes the Supplier of Soda Water to the Royal 
Household. In 1834, John Kemp-Welch and William Evill bought J. Schweppes & 
Co., and extended the product range to include flavoured soda drinks such as 
lemonade. The following year the firm was awarded the Royal warrant by Queen 
Victoria, and in 1851 it won the contract to supply “Temperance” beverages at the 
Great Exhibition in the UK.  By 1870, the firm’s product range included Tonic Water 
and Ginger Ale. The former rapidly became popular with the British in India, as it 
contained quinine, which was used as a preventive measure against malaria.  In 1877 
the firm opened its first factory in Sydney, Australia, and seven years later a factory in 
Brooklyn, NY.  
 
The sudden death of John Kemp-Welch in 1885 precipitated the formation of 
Schweppes as a limited company in the following year. Although no direct evidence 
exists on the ownership structure at this stage, it would appear that the company was 
100% owned by the directors until its public flotation in London on March 6, 1897.  
After flotation the directors and their families held collectively 27.2% of the 300,000 
ordinary shares. The new company, Schweppes plc, was incorporated to acquire the 
business of J. Schweppe and Co. established in 1783, and a total of £1,250,000 new 
capital (of which £300,000 was perpetual debenture stock issued to the directors, and   18
£950,000 was a public subscription, in the form of 300,000 ordinary shares, 300,000 
preference shares and 350,000 deferred shares). 
 
The public flotation was extremely successful and over-subscribed.  At the end of 
1897, there were more than 1650 ordinary shareholders and 750 preference 
shareholders. There was evidence of the company’s shares being traded in 
Manchester. 
 
In 1919 the Kemp-Welch family relinquished the chairmanship (although two 
members remained on the board until the early 1940s), and under the new chairman, 
Sir Ivor Phillips, the company started a new period of expansion. Overseas 
development was conducted through a newly formed fully owned subsidiary, 
Schweppes (Colonial and Foreign) Ltd.  The strategy was to manufacture locally in 
the overseas countries, in order to reduce the group’s reliance on exports. At the end 
of Sir Phillips chairmanship in 1940, the company had more than 2,700 ordinary 
shareholders, and it was formally listed on the London Stock Exchange in December 
19, 1942. 
 
During the 1950s there were several major acquisitions paid in shares: L. Rose and 
Co. acquired in 1957 with 1,544,400 new ordinary shares, and Chivers & Sons, W.P. 
Hartley, and W. Moorhouse all acquired in 1959 with together 4,000,000 new 
ordinary shares.  In 1969, Schweppes PLC merged with the Cadbury Group to form 
Cadbury-Schweppes. 
 
5.3  Case Study of Cadbury 
 
In 1794, Richard Cadbury a prominent Quaker moved from the West Country in 
Britain to Birmingham.  Thirty years later his son John opened a shop at 93 Bull 
Street, then a fashionable part of Birmingham, to sell tea, coffee, hops, mustard, and a 
new sideline – cocoa and drinking chocolate, which John prepared himself using a 
mortar and a pestle. 
 
In 1847 John Cadbury took his brother Benjamin into partnership in 1847, changing 
the name of the business to Cadbury Brothers of Birmingham, and renting a new   19
factory in Bridge Street in the centre of Birmingham.  Thanks to a reduction in tax on 
imported cocoa beans, the business expanded and received the first of a series of 
Royal Warrants of appointment by Queen Victoria. 
 
The Cadbury Brothers moved their manufacturing operations to Bournville, UK, and 
established the Bournville factory and village, which became an important addition to 
the UK industrial landscape.  By the time that Cadbury Brothers was incorporated as a 
limited company in June 16 1899, the Bournville factory had 2,600 employees.  At 
that stage, Richard and George Cadbury, the sons of the late John Cadbury, owned 
100% of the ordinary shares. 
 
1919 was a crucial year in the company history when Cadbury Brothers merged with 
JS Fry & sons of Bristol, whose product range (e.g. Turkish Delight) complemented 
Cadbury’s chocolates.  After the merger, the new company was registered as British 
Cocoa & Chocolate in May 19, 1919, with a capital of £2,500,000.  The two families 
shared both board seats and company ownership, with the Fry’s holding 4 seats on the 
board as well as the chairmanship and 45.44% of ordinary shares, and the Cadburys 
holding the rest (6 seats on the board, and 54.56% of ordinary shares).  Another 
former director of Fry also sat on the board. 
 
As the companies operations expanded, and factories opened around the world, the 
Fry family board representation declined, while Cadbury’s increased.  Shortly before 
the merger with Schweppes plc in 1969, the Cadbury family held the chairmanship 
and 7 of the 13 seats of the board of directors, while only one Fry remained on the 
board.  The Cadbury family held slightly more than 50 percent of the ordinary shares, 
while the Fry family held just over 10%.  The rest was dispersed among more than 
200 ordinary shareholders. There was evidence of trade on both London and 
Birmingham Stock Exchanges of ordinary and preference shares before the merger 
with Schweppes in 1969. 
 
These three case studies illustrate the speed with which ownership was dispersed and 
how much of the dilution of the original family’s ownership was due to acquisitions 
for share exchanges.  They also show how one of the founding families came to   20
dominate the merged entity even where the merger was apparently between equals. 
This dominance persisted as the ownership of the founding family dwindled. 
 
 
5  Takeovers in the second half of the century 
 
In the Spring of 1953, Charles Clore, a self-made millionaire from business and 
property ventures, launched a bid for J. Sears & Co., the parent company of a shoe 
shop chain-store, Freeman, Hardy and Willis.  Instead of following the conventional 
approach of negotiating with target management, Clore mailed offer documents direct 
to Sears’ shareholders over the heads of management.  “The Sears directors, who were 
taken entirely unawares, retaliated by announcing the tripling of the dividend.   
Shareholders were astonished by this sudden largesse, which was perceived as a 
desperate and irresponsible act on the part of the management.  Faith in the incumbent 
board being thoroughly undermined, there was a rush to sell to Clore, who quickly 
acquired control of the company.  ‘We never thought anything like this would happen 
to us’, were the Parthian words of the outgoing Sears’ chairman.” (Roberts (1992), p. 
186). 
 
The unconventional nature of the approach was reflected in exceptional financial 
features of the bid.  In contrast to the observation made above that dividends did not 
in general change around acquisitions, the Sears’ directors responded to the bid by 
tripling the value of their dividend.  While the average value of bid premia had 
historically been around zero, the bid premium for Sears was 90% in the month of the 
bid and 122% in the five months from month –4 to +1. 
 
As Table 7 shows, there were then several bids that recorded bid premia that were 
very large by previous standards.  In the case of the bid by Land Securities Investment 
Trust in autumn 1953 for the Savoy Hotel Co., owners of the Savoy, Claridge’s and 
Simpson’s in the Strand, the bid premium was 19% in the month of the bid and 87% 
in the five months around the bid.  In the bid for British Aluminium by Reynolds 
Metals of Virginia in 1958, the month zero bid premium was 17% and the five months 
bid premium was 17%. 
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It is not entirely clear why the takeover market emerged at this juncture in Britain.  
Alfred Chandler associates the emergence of a market for corporate control in the US 
with the rise in institutional shareholding (Chandler (1990)).  But, as Table 3 shows, 
in the UK the market for corporate control predated the accumulation of most 
institutional shareholdings.  A more plausible explanation is that the tighter financial 
disclosures required of company accounts by the 1948 Companies Act provided the 
basis on which corporate predators could for the first time make reasonably accurate 
estimates of asset values and earnings, and thus launch bids without the co-operation 
of the target (Hannah (1974b)). In Charles Clore’s takeover of Sears, Roberts (1992) 
reports that “Clore launched his attack on being informed by a partner in the estates 
agent Healey & Baker that Sears’ balance sheet under-estimated the real estate value 
of the firm’s 900 high street stores by £10 million” (page 186). 
 
The response of the corporate sector was to seek protection against the rapidly 
emerging takeover market.   It initially received a sympathetic ear from the 
government and the Bank of England, which were concerned about the impact of 
hostile acquisitions on the corporate sector and the government’s policy of dividend 
restraint (Roberts (1992)).  All levels of government were involved including in the 
case of the bid for the Savoy, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who was 
worried about the possible impact of the bid on his favourite dining club at the Savoy.  
But while it found this form of buccaneering capitalism distasteful and 
ungentlemanly, the government felt impotent to do much about it and in any event, by 
the time of the next merger wave at the end of the 1950’s, it had come round to the 
view that “Mr Clore appears to have improved the retail shoe trade of the country”. 
 
Unable to gain protection from the government, the corporate sector began to erect its 
own defences.  Table 8 reports incidence of anti-takeover measures in three years: 
1950, 1965 and 1975.  In the case of 1965 and 1975 the table also shows changes 
(adoptions of anti-takeover defences in existing companies, emergence of new 
companies with anti-takeover defences and abandonment by existing companies) from 
1950 and 1965 respectively.  Anti-takeover measures are said to exist if any of the 
following are present: dual class shares, voting restrictions or share blocks by insiders 
in excess of 50%.  Statistics are reported for three London Stock Exchange sector   22
classifications: Commercial and Industrial, Breweries and Distilleries, and Iron, Coal 
and Steel, which totals more than 2000 companies. 
 
Table 8 reports that the number of companies with anti-takeover measures increased 
from 73 in 1950 to 249 in 1965.  This represents an increase in incidence of anti-
takeover measures from 3.7% of the sample to 11.1% between 1950 and 1965.  There 
were 100 new adoptions by companies that were already in existence in 1950 and 92 
new companies were formed with anti-takeover defences.
7  The incidence of takeover 
defences therefore increased substantially during the 1950’s and 1960’s.
8 
 
A further form of takeover defence that emerged was to seek protection under the 
wing of a friendly company.  The brewing industry was particularly fragmented with 
a large number of small local brewers.  Whitbread took share stakes in several of 
these as a way of providing protection against hostile bidders.  
 
For a brief period during the 1950’s and 1960’s, the landscape of corporate Britain 
began to resemble that of Continental Europe.  There was an unregulated takeover 
market with the potential for acquiring control through purchases of partial share 
stakes and discriminatory offers.  Companies responded by introducing dual class 
shares and voting right restrictions and pyramid structures emerged as companies 
sought protection under the wing of others. 
 
But these takeover defences met with stiff opposition from an influential quarter – the 
institutional investors and the London Stock Exchange.  They were concerned about 
the interference with the takeover process, the ability of management to entrench itself 
behind takeover defences and the withdrawal of their voting rights.  Under pressure 
from the institutions, the Stock Exchange made it known that it disapproved of the use 
of dual class shares and would not permit their use in new equity issues.   
 
The intervention of the institutions and the Stock Exchange proved decisive and 
during the 1970’s and 1980’s companies steadily withdrew dual class shares.  Panel C 
                                                            
7  There is a residual of 16 companies that were delisted.   
8  The companies with anti-takeover measures were non-acquisitive companies and did not therefore 
expect to use their own shares to purchase other companies.   23
of Table 8 reports that by 1975, the proportion of listed companies with dual class 
shares in the three sectors had declined from 11.1% to 7.1%.  The number of 
companies in the Commercial and Industrial Sector that dropped dual class shares 
between 1965 and 1975 was well in excess of those that adopted them. By the late 
1980s there were only a handful of companies with dual class shares left among listed 
companies in the U.K.  
 
Meanwhile, under prompting from the Bank of England, in 1959 the City established 
a working party to produce a code of conduct for takeovers. This initially yielded a 
series of ineffectual recommendations but, in the face of several prominent takeover 
scandals
9 and under the looming threat of legislation, in 1967 it produced the City 
Code on Take-overs and Mergers and created the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers to 
enforce it.
10  This in due course established the principle of equal treatment of all 
shareholders, the requirement of acquiring firms to disclose their shareholdings and 
reveal their intentions, and the obligation to make offers for all shares at highest prices 
once 30% of the target firm’s shares had been acquired.  In other words, it recreated 
by self-regulation the equal price treatment that had prevailed by convention without 
regulation in the first half of the century before hostile takeovers. 
 
What is striking about these developments is the fact that the political process was not 
at the end of the day guided by the interests of the corporate sector which sought to 
limit hostile bids and to erect takeover defences but by those of the financial 
institutions.  It was the institutions that prevented firms from implementing dual class 
shares and the institutions that drew up the rules by which takeovers were 
subsequently conducted.  It was therefore the financial sector that prevented the UK 
from drifting into a Continental style corporate structure with dual class shares, 
pyramids and limitations on takeovers and set the ground rules by which an active 
market in corporate control could develop.  Through the takeover code and panel, the 
financial sector also prevented the corporate sector from erecting the takeover 
defences, in particular poison pills, that became commonplace in the US.  The distinct 
nature of the UK corporate sector is therefore in part a consequence of the dominance 
                                                            
9 One example of this was the Jasper Affair in 1959, involving take-over malpractice and the misuse of 
building society funds.   24
of equity institutions that placed shareholder returns above the private interests of 




This paper has documented the rapid erosion of family ownership of UK corporations 
during the 20
th century.  The dispersed ownership which characterizes the UK 
corporate system today emerged early in the 20
th century.  The UK did not start off 
life in the 20
th century like Germany or Italy today.  In terms of ownership 
concentration and the involvement of families, it looked more like the UK today than 
Germany or Italy. 
 
The observations on the dominance of families in the running of firms are a reflection 
of their board representation rather than their ownership.  Board participation by 
families became disproportionate to their ownership stakes.  There were good reasons 
for being concerned about this development.  The divergence between ownership and 
control undermined the efficient running of corporations, as documented by Chandler.   
 
But what was remarkable about this was the process by which it came about.  The 
decline in family ownership was not for the most part a consequence of families 
selling out but a result of equity issues.  These equity issues were not primarily used 
to finance internal growth (there was rather little use of equity for this purpose in the 
first half of the 20
th century) but to acquire other companies.  Equity financed 
acquisitions accounted for a high proportion of the dilution of family holdings. 
 
What is equally striking is the fact that these substantial equity issues took place 
against the background of informal, largely unregulated stock markets.  Nevertheless, 
shareholders trusted directors to uphold principles of equal price treatment for all.  
There was little evidence of the partial share offers and price discrimination that 
characterizes the takeover market in many countries today. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 The power of the Panel to sanction firms that do not comply with the Code has proved to be highly 
effective.   25
Why directors abided by this and were not tempted to accept cheaper partial offers at 
the expense of minority investors is not entirely clear.  But one clue comes from the 
significance of acquisitions and equity issuance to the growth of corporations.  Large 
British companies were particularly reliant on the stock market to fund growth.  This 
may reflect the absence of a local banking system of a type that exists in many other 
countries and through which companies in those countries are able to establish close 
relations and borrow on an ongoing basis.  To be able to access the stock market, 
companies in the UK had to sustain the trust of their shareholders, which in part 
revolved around ensuring that they were equally treated in new share issues.   
Discriminatory offers might reduce the costs of particular acquisitions but these were 
more than offset by the higher cost of using equity in subsequent acquisitions. 
Regulation was not therefore required since it was in the self-interest of directors to 
ensure the fair treatment of their shareholders. 
 
The non-discriminatory treatment of shareholders in takeovers also goes someway 
towards explaining the absence of pyramids in the UK.  Acquirors were not able to 
purchase the partial share stakes in companies that would have allowed them to create 
pyramids.  Target firms were absorbed into the merged company and essentially 
disappeared as separate listed entities. 
 
However, this collaborative arrangement broke down in the middle of the century in 
the face of a hostile takeover market.  Target directors were no longer in a position to 
enforce equal price rules since acquirors could go behind their back and appeal 
directly to controlling shareholders.  Directors initially tried to protect themselves and 
their minority investors by erecting takeover defences.  For a brief period, the UK 
took on the appearance of Continental Europe with dual class shares, pyramids and 
discriminatory price acquisitions.  But the takeover defences incurred the wrath of the 
institutions, which mounted a successful attack on them through the Stock Exchange 
and succeeded in devising the rules by which takeovers were to be conducted.   
 
Once again the development of the UK corporate sector was determined by the 
interests of shareholders to a degree that probably did not occur in most other 
countries.  At an optimistic level, the reason for the oddity of the UK noted at the start 
is the well-developed and efficient nature of its stock market and the dominance of   26
financial institutions that eschewed the private benefits of Continental Europe.   
Equally plausibly, it is a consequence of its centralized banking system and the 
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Table 1 – The number of companies and market capitalization of companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange 
This table reports London Stock Exchange statistics on number of listed companies and market capitalization from various 
sources. Panel A reports various sources pre–1950, and Panel B reports London Stock Exchange data from 1963 to 2000. 
 
 
Panel A – Various sources, pre-1950 
 
Date No.  listed 
companies, LSE 
No. listed companies, Provincial  Source 
1847   490
2  Killick and Thomas, 1970 
1853 200    Michie 
1913  1,700    Rajan & Zingales, 2003 
      
1885 70
1    Hart & Prais, 1956 
1907 571
1    Hart & Prais, 1956 
1939 1,712
1    Hart & Prais, 1956 
1Industrial companies only (Hart and Prais). 





Panel B – London Stock Exchange data from 1963  
 












(GDP/MV) No. of companies  Market value (£/M)
1963 4,409  4,064  32,204      .  . 
1970 3,418  3,197  37,793   44,200  0.86  387 57,135 
1980 2,747  2,283  86,720  201,000 0.43  394 183,846 
1990 2,006  2,081  450,544  479,000 0.94  553 1,124,131 
12000 1,904  2,272  1,796,811     501 3,525,701 
 
Source: London Stock Exchange 
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Table 2 – Family shareholdings and ownership thresholds 
This table reports the number of companies in our sample where the founding family owns more than 25%, 50%, and 75% of 
issued ordinary share capital, respectively. Panel A refers to the 1900 sample, and reports results separately for survivors and 
non-survivors. Panel B refers to the 1960 sample. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of companies where founding family shareholdings exceed 25%, 50%, and 75% of issued ordinary share 
capital for selected years, 1900 sample 
   Survivors   Non  Survivors   
  25%  50%  75% N.    25%  50%  75% N.    N.  Obs. 
1900  13  9 8 20 9 8 6  20  40 
1910  10  7 7 20 9 8 5  20  40 
1920  11  8 7 20 8 6 4  17  37 
1930  7 4 3 20 8 4 3  16  36 
1940  4 3 3 20 4 4 3  12  32 
1950  3 3 2 20 4 3 3  10  30 
1960  2 1 1 20 3 2 1 4  24 
1970  0 0 0 20 2 1 1 3  23 
1980  0 0 0 20 1 1 1 2  22 
1990  0 0 0 20 0 0 0 1  21 
2000  0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0  20 
 
 
Panel B: Number of companies where founding family shareholdings exceeds 25%, 50%, and 75% of issued ordinary share 
capital for selected years, 1960 sample 
 
  25%  50%  75% N.  Obs.
1960 16  15  7  20 
1970  8 5 3  20 
1980  7 2 1  20 
1990  1 1 0  20 
2000  0 0 0  20 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
   29
Table 3 – Is the largest shareholder an institution? 
This table reports the number of companies where the largest shareholder is an institution, along with the average size of these 
largest block holdings. Panel A refers to the 1900 sample, and reports results separately for survivors and non-survivors. Panel 
B refers to the 1960 sample. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of companies where the largest shareholder is an institution and block size for selected years, 1900 sample 
  Survivors Non  Survivors   
  Largest shareholder is an institution Block Size N. Obs. Largest shareholder is an institution  Block Size  N. Obs.  
1900 0  .  20  0  .  20   
1910 1  5.00  20  0  .  20   
1920 0  .  20  0  .  17   
1930 0  .  20  1  6.90  16   
1940 4  5.89  20  1  0.90  12   
1950 7  3.73  20  3  8.95  10   
1960 8  4.18  20  0  .  4   
1970  9 5.35  20  0  .  3   
1980  8 6.46  20  0  .  2   
1990  16 10.77  20  1  11.70  1   




Panel B: Number of companies where the largest shareholder is an institution and block size for selected years, 1960 sample 
  Largest shareholder is an institution  Block Size   N. Obs. 
1960 0  .  20 
1970  4 4.88  20 
1980  5 16.27  20 
1990  10 15.39  20 
2000  13 16.20  20 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 4– Board composition 
This table reports board size and the percentage of board members that do not come from the founding family. Panels A1 and 
A2 refer to the 1900 sample for survivors and non-survivors respectively. Panel B refers to the 1960 sample. 
 
 
Panel A1: Board composition for selected years, 1900 sample, survivors 
  Board size  Family CEO  Board members outside founding family (%)  N. Obs. 
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median   
1900 5.40  5.00  16  45.46  41.45  20 
1910 5.80  5.00  17  44.48  52.75  20 
1920 5.95  5.00  13  59.75  66.60  20 
1930 6.45  6.00  10  64.37  72.35  20 
1940 6.65  6.00  10  64.16  71.55  20 
1950 6.90  6.50  9  71.10  87.50  20 
1960 7.20  7.00  4  76.15  100.00  20 
1970 9.15  8.00  2  81.88  100.00  20 
1980 7.95  7.00  2  86.71  100.00  20 
1990 8.25  8.00  2  90.68  100.00  20 
2000 7.90  7.00  2  92.51  100.00  20 
Mean 7.05    7.91  70.66     
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Panel A2: Board composition for selected years, 1900 sample, non survivors 
  Board size  Family CEO  Board members outside founding family (%)  N. Obs. 
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median   
1900 4.93  4.00  11  68.23  100.00  20 
1910 5.33  5.00  10  76.44  100.00  20 
1920 5.92  5.50  9  70.34  72.90  17 
1930 5.82  5.00  8  72.82  77.70  16 
1940 4.86  6.00  5  92.84  100.00  12 
1950 3.50  3.50  3  95.83  100.00  10 
1960 9.67  8.00  3  100.00  100.00  4 
1970 5.50  5.50  2  100.00  100.00  3 
1980 7.00  7.00  2  100.00  100.00  2 
1990 4.00  4.00  0  100.00  100.00  1 
2000 .  .  0  100.00  100.00  0 
Mean 5.06    7.74  79.42     
 
 
Panel B: Board composition for selected years, 1960 sample 
  Board Size  Family CEO  Board members outside founding family (%)  N. Obs. 
 Mean  Median    Mean  Median   
1960 2.80  3.00  16  43.15  41.65  20 
1970 5.55  5.00  12  66.48  77.50  20 
1980 6.47  6.00  8  74.94  86.65  20 
1990 7.35  7.00  4  82.55  100.00  20 
2000 7.00  6.00  3  83.62  100.00  20 
Mean 5.83    10.90  70.15     
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 5– Separation of ownership and control 
This table reports mean and median separation of ownership and control. Separation is defined as the difference between the 
proportion of founding family members on the board and family shareholdings. A negative value indicates that there is a 
greater proportion of family ownership than board representation. Panel A refers to the 1900 sample, and reports results 
separately for survivors and non-survivors. Panel B refers to the 1960 sample. 
 
 
Panel A: Separation of ownership and control for selected years, 1900 sample 
 
  Survivors  No. of Survivors  Non-survivors  No. of  Non-
survivors  Full sample  N. Obs.
1900 –1.16  20  5.69  20  1.86  40 
1910 6.78  20  2.00  20  4.67  40 
1920 –7.87  20  9.88  17  –1.00  37 
1930 8.97  20  14.25  16  10.91  36 
1940 15.60  20  6.17  12  13.16  32 
1950 13.15  20  4.02  10  11.04  30 
1960 14.99  20  0.00  4  12.45  24 
1970 15.04  20  0.00  3  12.60  23 
1980 12.03  20  0.00  2  11.13  22 
1990 9.15  20  0.00  1  8.71  21 
2000 6.69  20  .  0  6.69  20 
Mean 8.50    6.94    8.13   
 
 
Panel B: Separation of ownership and control for selected years, 1960 sample 
 
 Mean  N.  Obs. 
1960 –1.52  20 
1970 3.13  20 
1980 6.70  20 
1990 10.50  20 
2000 11.94  20 
Mean 6.15   
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 6– Takeovers in the U. K., 1919–1939: Target board turnover and dividend changes 
This table reports the proportion of target directors that resign after a takeover, the number of target companies where the 
chairman resigns and the proportion of target companies keeping the dividend constant 2 years prior to the takeover for a 
sample of 40 takeovers over the period 1919–1939. 
 
 
Time period  Proportion of target board 
resigning after takeover  Chairman resigned  Dividend constant  N. Obs. 
1919–1923 5.36%  0  10  11 
1924–1928 33.76%  3  11  12 
1929–1933 16.68%  2  7  7 
1934–1939 57.80%  9  8  10 
Total 30.28%  14    40 
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Table 7 – Bid premia in the UK 
This table reports the bid premia for the UK in the twentieth century. Panel A considers 40 UK takeovers over the period 
1919–1939 and computes premia as the raw (unadjusted) stock returns for targets over the periods (–4 to +1) months and 
month 0, where month 0 is the announcement month. Panel B refers to the first three hostile takeover bids of the 1950s, as 
reported in Roberts (1992), and computes premia as in Panel A. Panel C refers to 1,463 UK takeovers in the period 1955–1985, 
and computes premia as the market–adjusted stock returns for targets over the periods (–4 to +1) months and month 0, where 
month 0 is the announcement month. The source for Panel C is Franks and Harris (1989). 
 
 
Panel A – Bid Premia in the U. K.:  1919–1939 
 
    Months –4 to +1  Month 0  Total Market Value 
Time Period  No.  EW  EW  (£/millions) 
1919–23 11  –10.02%  –3.34%  31.5 
1924–28 12  +14.69%  +0.55%  43.3 
1929–33 7  –    2.45%  –1.13%  19.0 
1934–39 10  +14.84%  +0.22%  26.6 
Mean   +    4.93%  –0.90%   
 




Panel B – Bid Premia in the U. K.: Hostile Takeovers 1953–1958 
 
    Months –4 to +1  Month 0 
Year Target  EW  EW 
1953 J.  Sears  122.22%  90.48% 
1958  Savoy Hotel    87.00%  19.53% 
1958  British Aluminium    39.53%  17.47% 
Mean       82.92%  42.49% 
 




Panel C – Bid Premia in the U. K.: 1955–1985  
 
    Months –4 to +1  Month 0  Total Market Value 
Time Period  No.  EW  VW EW VW  (£/billions) 
1955–59  151  28% 25% 16% 11%  0.5 
1960–64  190  24% 26% 18% 14%  1.4 
1965–69  262  27% 24% 19% 12%  3.7 
1970–74  196  35% 41% 25% 23%  2.8 
1975–79  383  38% 34% 30% 22%  3.8 
1980–84  281  27% 27% 25% 30%  10.0 
Mean   30% 30% 22% 19%   
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Table 8 –Incidence of anti–takeover measures 
This table reports the incidence of anti-takeover measures (dual class voting, voting restrictions and insider ownership greater 
than 50%) in the U.K in 1950 in Panel A, 1965 in Panel B and 1975 in Panel C. 
 
 
Panel A – 1950 
 
  No of companies  % of listed companies 
Commercial and Industrial  56  3.60% 
Breweries and Distilleries  13  6.30% 
Iron, Coal and Steel  4  1.82% 
    
Total 73  3.68% 
 
 
Panel B – 1965 
 
 Static  Analysis  Dynamic Analysis (since 1950) 
 No  of  companies
% of listed 
companies Adoptions    New  companies  Delisting 
Commercial and Industrial  236  11.80%  98  86  4 
Breweries and Distilleries  10  10.20%  2  4  9 
Iron, Coal and Steel  3  2.21%  0  2  3 
       
Total 249  11.15%  100  92  16 
 
 
Panel C – 1975 
 
 Static  Analysis  Dynamic Analysis (since 1965) 
 No  of  companies 
% of listed 
companies Adoptions   
New 
companies Dropped   Delisting 
Commercial and Industrial  145  7.25%  18  7  32 84 
Breweries  and  Distilleries  6  6.06% 1 0 1 4 
Iron,  Coal  and  Steel  1  2.08% 0 0 1 1 
          
Total 152  7.08%  19  7  34  89 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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